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	<title>Comments on: Appeasement - Iraq&#8217;s Tangled Skein</title>
	<link>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/</link>
	<description>Redball R-Square of your broken Nav and Intel Systems keeping you oncourse to the truth!</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 08 Feb 2012 01:12:51 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Fix 4 RSO &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Yellow Cake with French Frosting</title>
		<link>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/#comment-2223</link>
		<dc:creator>Fix 4 RSO &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Yellow Cake with French Frosting</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Sep 2006 15:22:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/#comment-2223</guid>
		<description>[...] I&#8217;ve posted before, and this is only one look into the fistula that is the GWOT (Global War on Terror), how Iraq was pushing very hard to work closely with France. In this FMSO doc, it is blatant and clear just what was a-foot (take a step with me, here - pun intended): Tariq Aziz to Saddam on France TARIQ &#8216;AZIZ: After the General Assembly, when meeting with the French Prime Minister in private, I asked him, &#8220;how is your relation with Guinea Bissau?&#8221; He replied, &#8220;very good&#8221;. Thereafter, I told him, &#8220;I would like you to take care of that &#8230; that is to say, for them to take our side. Therefore, he promises to do just that. We are expecting the atmosphere in the Security Council to change relatively from last year, to our advantage, especially if we achieve greater progress with Ekeus&#8217;s file. The French, was reserved [firm] in regards to Ekeus or to the issue of Resolution 986, that is to say, he has a firm attitude. He told me, &#8220;when you go to Paris you can discuss the issues&#8221;. Thereafter, when I arrived in Paris, two days before the official meeting, I observed through my discussion with their Ambassador and [UNINTELLIGIBLE] which they are our close friends from the French Foreign Ministry, that the atmosphere in France is firm, that is to say, it is firm with us &#8230; I told my friend, which is the person who we communicate through, to setup a secret meeting with Jacques Chirac, so we finish &#8230; [INTERRUPTED] &#8230; They said that it could be difficult. I told them to talk to him and see, at any rate, if he could not see me, let us talk on the phone &#8230; By God, the next day he contacted me and said, I am coming to see you right now, ahhh &#8230; meaning, I am on my way right now. He brought a phone with him when he came. However, Sir, this happened because of the stipulations on us to &#8230; SADDAM: [Yes] TARIQ &#8216;AZIZ: &#8230; [INTERRUPTED] Your Excellency, I must tell you this to complete the picture, he brought the phone with him and I talked with the President [Jacques Chirac] At the beginning, he started by saying, I want to help you. You are &#8230; [INTERRUPTED] Truthfully, I told him in so many words ahhh &#8230; what these issues require and what we are now asking. I also told him that we have not met for eleven months; we need to meet so we can provide you with information about Ekeus. He [Ekeus] will not present his report unless you apply pressure against the American pressure, which is the past Italian pressure. I explained other points to him and honestly, without hesitation, he said, &#8220;I will give instructions to the Foreign Ministry now to be completely open with you and to exchange and analyze the information, we will help you. We will call to give instructions to our Ambassador in New York to work in complete coordination with you in regards to this specific issue&#8221;. When I met with the Prime Minister on the evening of the next day, after my meeting with the Foreign Minister, during the private interview, he said, &#8230; I said, I ahhh &#8230; I mean, this issue was &#8230; I mean, when I met with the Foreign Minister, he was excited, I mean, not bad &#8230; [Laughing] &#8230; Foreign Minister? This is what we need from you, to pressure Ekeus, scrutinize him, and ask him when he will be finished and to tell him that this is what Iraq has provided, also for your Ambassador in New York to do whatever he is able to do. He told me yes, especially at the time when the Foreign Relations are warm, and the leadership is cold. Now it is the opposite, the situation has been reversed, the leadership is warm, and the Foreign Relations are cold, however, he told me that this has been solved. Chirac met with me today and told me to take the procedures and tell the Minister and the Ambassador and assure them that this issue has been solved. Therefore, the man was sure of his promise over the phone and put the Prime Minister in charge of giving the instructions. The Foreign Minister was friendly and serious at the meeting. We know the Minister, we met him before, however, we reached a level of understanding and he followed the instructions. I mean, at the end, when I was leaving, he assured me of his support, encouraged me, and said, if you are able, even by phone, call me and inform me if anything should happen. I mean, he encourages quick communications. Therefore, if they did not have the will for teamwork and cooperation, I believe, after my visit to Paris, the French position has been restored. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] I&#8217;ve posted before, and this is only one look into the fistula that is the GWOT (Global War on Terror), how Iraq was pushing very hard to work closely with France. In this FMSO doc, it is blatant and clear just what was a-foot (take a step with me, here - pun intended): Tariq Aziz to Saddam on France TARIQ &#8216;AZIZ: After the General Assembly, when meeting with the French Prime Minister in private, I asked him, &#8220;how is your relation with Guinea Bissau?&#8221; He replied, &#8220;very good&#8221;. Thereafter, I told him, &#8220;I would like you to take care of that &#8230; that is to say, for them to take our side. Therefore, he promises to do just that. We are expecting the atmosphere in the Security Council to change relatively from last year, to our advantage, especially if we achieve greater progress with Ekeus&#8217;s file. The French, was reserved [firm] in regards to Ekeus or to the issue of Resolution 986, that is to say, he has a firm attitude. He told me, &#8220;when you go to Paris you can discuss the issues&#8221;. Thereafter, when I arrived in Paris, two days before the official meeting, I observed through my discussion with their Ambassador and [UNINTELLIGIBLE] which they are our close friends from the French Foreign Ministry, that the atmosphere in France is firm, that is to say, it is firm with us &#8230; I told my friend, which is the person who we communicate through, to setup a secret meeting with Jacques Chirac, so we finish &#8230; [INTERRUPTED] &#8230; They said that it could be difficult. I told them to talk to him and see, at any rate, if he could not see me, let us talk on the phone &#8230; By God, the next day he contacted me and said, I am coming to see you right now, ahhh &#8230; meaning, I am on my way right now. He brought a phone with him when he came. However, Sir, this happened because of the stipulations on us to &#8230; SADDAM: [Yes] TARIQ &#8216;AZIZ: &#8230; [INTERRUPTED] Your Excellency, I must tell you this to complete the picture, he brought the phone with him and I talked with the President [Jacques Chirac] At the beginning, he started by saying, I want to help you. You are &#8230; [INTERRUPTED] Truthfully, I told him in so many words ahhh &#8230; what these issues require and what we are now asking. I also told him that we have not met for eleven months; we need to meet so we can provide you with information about Ekeus. He [Ekeus] will not present his report unless you apply pressure against the American pressure, which is the past Italian pressure. I explained other points to him and honestly, without hesitation, he said, &#8220;I will give instructions to the Foreign Ministry now to be completely open with you and to exchange and analyze the information, we will help you. We will call to give instructions to our Ambassador in New York to work in complete coordination with you in regards to this specific issue&#8221;. When I met with the Prime Minister on the evening of the next day, after my meeting with the Foreign Minister, during the private interview, he said, &#8230; I said, I ahhh &#8230; I mean, this issue was &#8230; I mean, when I met with the Foreign Minister, he was excited, I mean, not bad &#8230; [Laughing] &#8230; Foreign Minister? This is what we need from you, to pressure Ekeus, scrutinize him, and ask him when he will be finished and to tell him that this is what Iraq has provided, also for your Ambassador in New York to do whatever he is able to do. He told me yes, especially at the time when the Foreign Relations are warm, and the leadership is cold. Now it is the opposite, the situation has been reversed, the leadership is warm, and the Foreign Relations are cold, however, he told me that this has been solved. Chirac met with me today and told me to take the procedures and tell the Minister and the Ambassador and assure them that this issue has been solved. Therefore, the man was sure of his promise over the phone and put the Prime Minister in charge of giving the instructions. The Foreign Minister was friendly and serious at the meeting. We know the Minister, we met him before, however, we reached a level of understanding and he followed the instructions. I mean, at the end, when I was leaving, he assured me of his support, encouraged me, and said, if you are able, even by phone, call me and inform me if anything should happen. I mean, he encourages quick communications. Therefore, if they did not have the will for teamwork and cooperation, I believe, after my visit to Paris, the French position has been restored. [&#8230;]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Fix4RSO</title>
		<link>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/#comment-1108</link>
		<dc:creator>Fix4RSO</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2006 01:16:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/#comment-1108</guid>
		<description>Thanks, Buck.

I've been going through about 200+ PDF docs looking for stuff we have not seen already. Takes time, but there are some AMAZING gems ... truly!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks, Buck.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve been going through about 200+ PDF docs looking for stuff we have not seen already. Takes time, but there are some AMAZING gems &#8230; truly!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Buck</title>
		<link>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/#comment-1093</link>
		<dc:creator>Buck</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Jul 2006 16:37:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://fix4rso.com/2006/07/13/appeasement-iraqs-tangled-skein/#comment-1093</guid>
		<description>Interesting stuff, Steve.  Thanks for the detective work...ya done good!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting stuff, Steve.  Thanks for the detective work&#8230;ya done good!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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